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ABSTRACT  
Edith Penrose’s 1959 book The Theory of the Growth of the Firm [TGF] provides intellectual 
foundations for a theory of innovative enterprise, which is essential to any attempt to explain 
productivity growth, employment opportunity, and income distribution. Properly understood, 
Penrose’s theory of the firm is also an antidote to the deception that is foundational to 
neoclassical economics: The theory, taught by PhD economists to millions upon millions of 
college students for over seven decades, that the most unproductive firm is the foundation of the 
most efficient economy. The dissemination of this “neoclassical fallacy” to a mass audience of 
college students began with Paul A. Samuelson’s textbook, Economics: An Introductory 
Analysis, first published in 1948. Over the decades, the neoclassical fallacy has persisted through 
18 revisions of Samuelson, Economics and in its countless “economics principles” clones. This 
essay challenges the intellectual hegemony of neoclassical economics by exposing the illogic of 
its foundational assumptions about how a modern economy functions and performs.  
  
The neoclassical fallacy gained popularity in the 1950s, during which decade Samuelson revised 
Economics three times. Meanwhile, Penrose derived the logic of organizational learning that she 
lays out in TGF from the facts of firm growth, absorbing what was known in the 1950s about the 
large corporations that had come to dominate the U.S. economy. Also, during that decade, the 
knowledge base on the growth of firms on which economists could subsequently draw was 
undergoing an intellectual revolution, led by the business historian, Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. He 
was engaged in the first stage of a career that would span more than a half century, during which 
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Chandler documented and analyzed the centrality to U.S economic development of what he 
would come to call “the managerial revolution in American business.”  
  
In combination, the works of Penrose and Chandler form intellectual foundations for my own 
work on the Theory of Innovative Enterprise—an endeavor that has enabled me, as an economist, 
to recognize not only the profound importance of organizational learning for economic theory 
but also the illogic of the neoclassical theory of the firm for our understanding of the central 
institution of  a modern economy, the business corporation. In this essay, I argue that the key 
characteristic of the innovative enterprise is fixed-cost investment in the productive capabilities 
of the company’s employees to engage in organizational learning. The purpose of this investment 
in organizational learning is to develop a higher-quality product than was previously available. 
When successful, the development of the higher-quality product enables the firm to capture a 
large extent of the market, transforming high fixed cost into low unit cost. The result is 
sustainable competitive advantage that enables the growth of the firm, contributing to the growth 
of the economy as a whole.  
I argue that to get beyond the neoclassical fallacy, economists have to stop relying on 
constrained-optimization methodology. Rather, they need to be trained in a “historical 
transformation” methodology that integrates history and theory. It is a methodology in which 
theory serves as both a distillation of what we have learned from the study of history and a guide 
to what we need to learn about reality as the “present as history” unfolds.  
  
JEL Codes: A2, B3, B4, D2, D4, D8, J3, L1, L2, M2, N8, O1, O3  
Keywords: Theory of the firm, Penrosian learning, Chandlerian history, innovative enterprise, 
economic performance, Paul Samuelson, neoclassical fallacy, constrained optimization, historical 
transformation  
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1. Penrosian Learning and Innovative Enterprise  
  
Edith Penrose’s 1959 book The Theory of the Growth of the Firm [TGF] fits the definition of a 
“classic”: a work that many cite but few have read.2 The view that I advance in this essay is that 
no one should be granted a PhD in economics who has not read TGF and understood what this 
profound economist had to say. Penrose’s theory of how firms grow has transformative 
implications for comprehending how a modern economy functions and performs. It provides 
intellectual foundations for a theory of innovative enterprise, which is essential to any attempt to 
explain productivity growth, employment opportunity, and income distribution.  
  
Properly understood, Penrose’s theory of the firm is also, as I demonstrate in this essay, an antidote 
to the deception that is foundational to neoclassical economics: The theory, taught by PhD 
economists to millions upon millions of college students for over seven decades, that the most 
unproductive firm is the foundation of the most efficient economy. I call this academic nonsense 
the “neoclassical fallacy.” Its dissemination to a mass audience of college students began with Paul 
A. Samuelson’s neoclassical textbook, Economics: An Introductory Analysis, first published in 
1948. Over the decades, the neoclassical fallacy has persisted through 18 revisions of Samuelson’s 
Economics and in its countless “economics principles” clones. This essay challenges the 
intellectual hegemony of neoclassical economics by exposing the illogic of its foundational 
assumptions about how a modern economy functions and performs.  
  
The neoclassical fallacy gained popularity in the 1950s, during which decade, as an MIT professor, 
Samuelson revised Economics three times. Meanwhile, Penrose formulated the logic of 
organizational learning that she lays out in TGF from the facts of firm growth, absorbing what was 
known in the 1950s about the large corporations that had come to dominate the U.S. economy. 
Also during that decade, the knowledge base on the growth of firms on which economists could 
subsequently draw was undergoing an intellectual revolution led by the business historian, Alfred 
D. Chandler, Jr., who was engaged in the first stage of a career that would span more than a half 
century. Chandler’s contribution documented and analyzed the centrality to U.S economic 
development of what he would call “the managerial revolution in American business.”34  
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In TGF, Penrose depicts the large industrial corporation as one that grows by investing in 
organizational learning that endows with unique productive capabilities. Its long-term strategy is 
to build on its success in developing capabilities in one line of business by redeploying these 
capabilities to a new, technologically related lines of business as the older one matures. As 
Chandler shows in his seminal book Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of American 
Industrial Enterprise, published just three years after TGF, from the 1920s through the 1950s U.S. 
industrial firms implemented the multidivisional structure to enable one company to manage 
efficiently many different lines of business in its process of growth.5    
  
Covering the same subject matter and time period as Penrose, Chandler’s Strategy and Structure 
confirmed that her theory of the growth of the firm depicted the type of industrial corporation that 
had in fact driven the growth of the U.S. economy from the 1920s through the 1950s. Indeed, in 
1960, one year after the publication of TGF, Penrose made a direct contribution to what would 
become known as Chandlerian business history with her prize-winning publication in Business 
History Review of a case study of growth through multidivisionalization at Hercules Powder 
Company, a corporation that she had studied through field research in 1954.6  
  
For both Penrose and Chandler, multidivisionalization overcame managerial constraints on the 
growth of the firm by placing strategic control of the growth process in the hands of salaried 
executives who, by virtue of being career employees, had deep understanding of the evolving 
technologies and markets of the industries in which the companies that they led competed.  The 
multidivisional structure could be used to manage multiple lines of business efficiently if these 
businesses were in industries related by technological capability and/or product markets. The 
importance of that proviso would become clear when, justified by the ideology that a good manager 
could manage anything, the conglomerates that expanded through merger and acquisition in 
unrelated businesses in the 1960s collapsed in the 1970s and 1980s under their own unmanageable 
weight.7  
  
The particular technological and market characteristics of an industry are important to the 
Penrosian perspective because a firm that can grow successfully is one that engages in 
organizational learning specific to that industry. In TGF, Penrose conceptualizes the modern 
corporate enterprise as an organization that administers a collection of human and physical 
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resources. People contribute labor services to the firm not merely as individuals but as team 
members that engage in learning about how to make best use of the firm’s productive resources.  
This learning is organizational; it cannot be done all alone, and hence is collective, and it cannot 
be done all at once, and hence is cumulative.8   
  
At any point in time, this organizational learning endows the firm with experience that gives it 
productive opportunities unavailable to other firms, even in the same industry, that have not 
invested in these learning processes and, therefore, have not accumulated the same innovative 
experience. The accumulation of these unique capabilities enables the firm to overcome the 
“managerial limit” that, in the neoclassical theory of the firm, causes the onset of increasing cost 
and constrains the growth of the firm. The innovating firm can transfer and reshape its existing 
productive capabilities to take advantage of new market opportunities.   
  
Each strategic move into a new line of business enables the firm to utilize productive capabilities, 
including human capabilities, that had been accumulated through the process of organizational 
learning in generating its previous, now mature, products. These unused productive capabilities, 
along with reinvestment of some of the profits that they previously generated, provide foundations 
for the further growth of the firm, achieved through in-house complementary investments in new 
productive capabilities or the acquisition of other firms that have already developed these 
complementary capabilities. For Penrose, the growth of the firm through movement into new lines 
of business is not a random process but rather entails strategic investments to ensure the utilization, 
and the further development, of the productive capabilities of the firm’s employees over the course 
of their careers.  
  
In his 1977 book The Visible Hand, which covers the historical period for the half century before 
the 1920s that set the stage for the emergence of the multidivisional structure, Chandler’s focus is 
on the use of managerial coordination to integrate mass production and mass distribution, 
achieving what he calls “economies of speed”—or economics of scale per unit of time.9 This 
highspeed (or high-throughput) utilization of productive capabilities transforms the high fixed cost 
of investing in productive capabilities into low unit cost of sold output. Chandler emphasizes that 
the source of high fixed cost is investment not only in plant and equipment designed for mass 
production but also in distribution channels required to access a large enough extent of the market 
so that the mass-produced goods can be sold at competitive prices. The higher the rate of 
throughput from investment in input to sold output, the lower the unit cost and the greater the profit 
that can be generated.   
  
This profit is then available to be reinvested in the productive capabilities of the firm and/or shared 
among those who have contributed to the value-creating processes that have been the source of 
profit. Building on my analysis of how cooperation between employers and employees served to 
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generate productivity gains in which both parties could share, as set out in my 1990 book 
Competitive Advantage on the Shop Floor, my contribution to the Chandlerian historical analysis 
of the relation between managerial coordination and economies of speed has been to show how, 
by the 1920s, this “win-win” outcome was partially achieved, even without unions, in U.S. 
massproduction workplaces. With mass layoffs of blue-collar workers in the 1930s, however, 
cooperative relations between management and labor broke down in major U.S. industrial 
enterprises. The consequent rise of mass-production unionism, with its protection of workers’ 
seniority rights, resurrected management-labor cooperation in the immediate post-World II 
decades, contributing to more stable and more equitable growth in the U.S. economy as a whole. 
By the 1970s, however, by virtue of their even more thorough organizational integration of 
shopfloor workers into the processes of mass production, the Japanese were outcompeting U.S. 
business in industries such as automobiles, electronics, and steel, in which U.S. companies had 
been the world’s leading mass producers.10  
  
In The Visible Hand, Chandler focuses on the utilization of productive capabilities while largely 
ignoring the development of productive capabilities, which is the primary emphasis of Penrose’s 
theory of the growth of the firm. As a result, in this earlier work, Chandler does not explicitly 
analyze investment in human capabilities as a component of fixed cost. But in his 1990 book Scale 
and Scope, in which he compares “the dynamics of industrial capitalism” in the United States, 
Britain, and Germany, Chandler begins to focus on the development of productive capabilities 
through organizational-learning processes. This business activity is inherent in the concept of 
economies of scope; the spreading of a firm’s fixed costs across many lines of business, organized 
through multidivisionalization, as Chandler had previously documented and analyzed in Strategy 
and Structure. Recognizing the importance of the development, and not just the utilization, of 
productive capabilities to the growth of the firm, in 1993 Chandler launched what he called his 
“paths of learning” project, researching and writing two books, one on the history of the consumer 
electronic and computer industries and the other on the evolution of the chemical and 
pharmaceutical industries.11   
  
In combination, the works of Penrose and Chandler provide intellectual foundations for my own 
work on the Theory of Innovative Enterprise (TIE)—an endeavor that has enabled me, as an 
economist, to recognize not only the profound importance of organizational learning for a theory 
of economic development but also the illogic of using the neoclassical theory of the firm for 
understanding the central institution of a modern economy, the business corporation. In the next 
section of this essay, building on Penrosian theory and Chandlerian history, I outline the basic 
assumptions and concepts of TIE. In Section 3, I make use of TIE to demonstrate the neoclassical 
fallacy: the argument that the most unproductive firm is the foundation of the most efficient 
economy. Then, in Section 4, I draw out the implications of the neoclassical fallacy for what I call 
“the myth of the market economy”: the dominance in economic thinking of the view that, ideally 
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even if not actually, a modern economy should rely on markets to allocate resources to their most 
efficient uses—in effect viewing the large corporation as a massive “market imperfection.” In the 
concluding section of this essay, I summarize the methodological implications of TIE for studying 
the operation and performance of a modern economy.  
  
2. The Theory of Innovative Enterprise  
  
The Theory of Innovative Enterprise (TIE) that I have constructed through decades of research and 
teaching provides an analytical perspective on the microfoundations for achieving stable and 
equitable economic growth—or what, as a shorthand, I call “sustainable prosperity.” There is no 
way in which an economy can attain stable and equitable growth unless its major business 
enterprises focus on investing in productive capabilities for the sake of generating innovative 
products. Beginning with a characterization of the innovation process as uncertain, collective, and 
cumulative, TIE articulates three “social conditions of innovative enterprise”—strategic control, 
organizational integration, and financial commitment—that can support the innovation process. 
Armed with TIE, we can analyze the impacts of the innovation process on employment 
opportunity, income distribution, and productivity growth. We can ask whether the dominant 
characteristics of the nation’s major business enterprises support or undermine the attainment of 
stable and equitable growth in the national economy as a whole.  
  
TIE is an analytical framework for understanding how a business enterprise can generate a product 
that is higher quality and lower cost than products previously available, and thus be a source of 
productivity growth. As noted above, the innovation process that can generate a higher-quality, 
lower-cost product is uncertain, collective, and cumulative:12     
  
• Uncertain: When investments in transforming technologies and accessing markets are made, 
the product and financial outcomes cannot be known; if they were, the process would not be 
innovation. Hence the need for strategy.   
• Collective: To generate a higher-quality, lower-cost product, the enterprise must integrate the 
skills and efforts of large numbers of people with different hierarchical responsibilities and 
functional specialties into the learning processes that are the essence of innovation. Hence the 
need for organization.  
• Cumulative: Collective learning today enables collective learning tomorrow, and, to generate 
a higher-quality, lower-cost product, these organizational-learning processes must be sustained 
continuously over time until, through the sale of innovative products, financial returns can be 
generated. Hence the need for finance.  
  
Strategic control, organizational integration, and financial commitment enable the firm to manage 
the uncertain, collective, and cumulative character of the innovation process.    
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• Strategic control: For innovation to occur in the face of technological, market, and 
competitive uncertainties, executives who control corporate resource allocation must have the 
abilities and incentives to make strategic investments in innovation. Their abilities depend on 
their knowledge of how strategic investments in new capabilities can enhance the enterprise’s 
existing capabilities. Their incentives depend on alignment of their personal interests and 
values with the company’s purpose of generating innovative products.  
• Organizational integration: The implementation of an innovative strategy requires 
integration of people working in a complex division of labor into the collective and cumulative 
learning processes that are the essence of innovation. Work satisfaction, promotion, 
remuneration, and benefits are instruments in a reward system that motivates and empowers 
employees to engage in collective learning over a sustained period of time.   
• Financial commitment: For collective learning to cumulate over time, the sustained 
commitment of “patient capital” must keep the learning organization intact. For a startup 
company, venture capital can provide financial commitment. For a going concern, retained 
earnings (leveraged, if need be, by debt issues) are the foundation of financial commitment.  
  
The uncertainty of an innovative strategy is embodied in the fixed-cost investments required to 
develop the productive capabilities that may, if the strategy is successful, result in a higher-quality 
product than those available on the market. The higher-quality product, for which those buyers 
who are less price sensitive will be willing to pay a premium, gives the innovating firm a 
competitive advantage on the market. Assuming that the firm can maintain this higher quality as it 
increases output to serve a larger market, it will drive down unit cost as it spreads out its fixed cost 
over a larger quantity of sold output, which in turn gives the firm greater access to those buyers 
who are more price sensitive.    
  
By the same token, if the expansion of the firm’s output necessitates the utilization of additional 
variable inputs (purchased at a constant factor price on the particular factor market as required for 
the firm to expand its output) that turn out to be inferior in quality to those used previously, the 
rise in average variable cost (AVC) will to some extent offset the decline in average fixed cost 
(AFC) as the firm expands output. If the rise in AVC more than offsets the decline in AFC, then 
average total cost (ATC) will rise. Economists call this cost condition “internal diseconomies of 
scale,” depicted in the textbooks by the U-shaped cost curve, shown on the left-hand side of Figure  
1.    
  
The neoclassical theory of the firm assumes that profits are competed away as more identical firms 
enter an industry. Reflecting the neoclassical fallacy, under conditions of “perfect competition”— 
assumed to be the best of all possible economic worlds—the profits that each firm maximizes by 
equating marginal cost and marginal revenue equal zero. The action of maximizing profit (or, 
alternatively, minimizing cost) is known as “optimizing” subject to given technological and market 
constraints—or “constrained optimization”—and hence, as shown on the right-hand side of Figure 
1, we can compare the cost structures of the “innovating firm” of TIE and the “optimizing firm” 
of the neoclassical textbooks.  
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In the neoclassical theory of the firm, the perfectly elastic demand curve shown in Figure 1 
indicates that the firm can sell output up to the point at which it can maximize profit (marginal 
revenue equals marginal cost) without placing discernible downward pressure on the price of the 
product it is selling. The industry demand curve is typically (and in most cases reasonably) 
assumed to be downward sloping, but in “perfect competition” each of the large numbers of 
identical firms in the industry is so small relative to the size of the industry as a whole that it can 
sell any level of output needed to maximize profit at the current industry price. If the market price 
of the product happens to be greater than the minimum price on the average cost curve, neoclassical 
theory argues, more identical firms will enter the industry, driving down the product price to the 
point at which all firms maximize profit at a price-output equilibrium at which profits are zero.  
Neoclassical economists have long called this state of industry affairs “perfect competition”—a 
concept to which we shall return when we dissect the neoclassical fallacy in Section 3 of this essay.   
  
Figure 1. The innovating firm outcompetes the optimizing firm  
  
  
Key to TIE is the argument that, through the combination of strategy, organization, and finance, 
an innovating firm may be able to differentiate itself from its competitors and generate a 
higherquality, lower-cost product that, as shown in Figure 1, gives it a sustained competitive 
advantage. Note, however, that an innovative strategy that may eventually enable the firm to 
generate a higherquality, lower-cost product may place the innovating firm at a competitive 
disadvantage at low levels of output, as indicated in Figure 1. The reason is that an innovative 
strategy tends to entail higher fixed cost than the fixed cost incurred under the strategy of 
optimizing subject to given technological and market constraints. As an essential part of the 
innovation process, the innovating firm must transform technology and access a sufficient extent 
of the market for its product to transform high fixed cost into low unit cost (see Figure 1), and, 
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thereby, convert competitive disadvantage at low levels of output into competitive advantage at 
high levels of output.  
   
The higher fixed cost of the innovating firm derives from both the size and the duration of the 
innovative investment strategy. The innovating firm will have a higher fixed cost than the 
optimizing firm incurs if, as is typically the case, the innovation process requires the simultaneous 
development of productive capabilities across a broader and deeper range of integrated activities 
than those undertaken by the optimizing firm. Put differently, the innovating firm chooses to 
“make” rather than “buy”: Investment in the organizational learning that may be able to generate 
a higher-quality product means that, strategically, the innovating firm may have to eschew the 
purchase of certain “variable-cost” inputs on the market that would be needed to expand output, 
investing instead in vertically integrated operations to supply that particular factor of production.  
For the sake of developing a higher-quality product, the innovating firm chooses to incur fixed cost 
rather than avail itself of the option that the existence of one or more factor markets holds out for 
incurring variable cost.  
  
In addition to the size of the fixed cost of the innovative investment strategy at a given point in 
time, the firm’s fixed cost will increase with the duration that is required to transform technologies 
and access markets until these processes result in products that are sufficiently high quality and 
low cost to generate returns through product-market sales. If the size of investments in physical 
capital tends to increase the fixed cost of an innovative strategy, so too does the duration of the 
investment required for an organization of people to engage in the collective and cumulative—that 
is, organizational—learning that innovation requires. As we have seen, organizational learning to 
transform technologies and access markets is the central characteristic of the innovation process.  
  
The high fixed cost of an innovative strategy creates the need for the firm to attain a high level of 
utilization of the productive capabilities that it has developed and thus to achieve “economies of 
scale.” Meanwhile, as already discussed, when it needs an input that is available on a certain factor 
market in sufficient quality and quantity, the innovating firm can choose to purchase additional 
quantities of the input as required to expand output, thus incurring the variable cost of using the 
market as opposed to the fixed cost of investing in the firm. Yet, during the innovation process, 
the strategic decision-maker’s initial assumption that the innovating firm can expand output by 
accessing an increasing quantity of variable input of the required quality may not be borne out as 
more output is produced for sale. Given the productive capabilities that it has developed, the 
innovating firm may experience increasing cost because of the problem of maintaining the quality 
of a variable input as it employs a larger quantity of this input in the production process.   
  
But rather than, as in the case of the optimizing firm, take increasing cost as a given constraint on 
the growth of the firm, the innovating firm attempts to transform its access to high-quality 
productive capabilities at high levels of output. To do so, it invests in the development of that 
productive capability, the utilization of which has become the source of increasing variable cost. 
To overcome the constraint on its innovative strategy posed by reliance on the market to supply it 
with an input—which is what accessing a variable factor of production entails—the innovating 
firm integrates the supply of that factor into its internal operations, as depicted in Figure 2. In the 
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process, it transforms a variable cost into a fixed cost, and then seeks to develop the productive 
capability of that integrated input to justify the augmented fixed-cost investment.   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Figure 2. Innovative strategy and the restructuring of the cost curve  
  
  
  
Previously this productive resource was utilized as a variable input that could be purchased 
incrementally at the going factor price as extra units of the input were needed to expand output. 
But having found that the expansion of output results in a deterioration in the quality of the variable 
Lazonick: Is the Most Unproductive Firm the Foundation of the Most Efficient Economy?  
  13  
input, the innovating firm changes its strategy from “buy” to “make.”13 Having, as a result, added 
to its fixed cost in order to overcome the constraint on enterprise expansion posed by increasing 
variable cost, the innovating firm is then under even more pressure to generate a higher-quality 
product so that it can expand its sold output to transform high fixed cost into low unit cost.  In 
effect, to restate the first principle of economics enunciated by Adam Smith in The Wealth of 
Nations,14 economies of scale are limited by the extent of the market. The firm’s higher-quality 
product enables it to access a larger extent of the market than its competitors. Indeed, learning 
about what potential buyers want and convincing potential buyers that the firm’s product is actually 
“higher quality” add to the fixed cost of the innovative strategy. Since its fixed cost results from 
investments in not only transforming technology but also accessing markets, the innovating firm’s 
increase in fixed cost requires an even larger extent of the market to convert high fixed cost into 
low unit cost.   
When, through the development and utilization of productive capabilities, the innovating firm 
succeeds in the conversion of high fixed cost into low unit cost, it does not merely “unbend” the 
U-shaped cost curve but rather restructures it. By reshaping the cost curve in this way, the 
innovating firm creates the possibility of securing competitive advantage over its “optimizing” 
rivals who, as instructed by the economics textbooks, accept increasing diseconomies of scale as a 
given constraint (see Figure 1 above).  
  
A potent way for an innovating firm to attain a larger extent of the market is to share some of the 
gains of this cost transformation with its customers in the form of lower prices. If so, the innovating 
firm may sell a higher quantity of output at a lower price than its “optimizing” competitors. If the 
innovating firm continues to expand its market share, it will drive optimizing firms out of the 
market because they are, relatively, unproductive firms.  
   
The emergence of an innovative enterprise—one that secures a large market share by generating a 
higher-quality, lower-cost product than was previously available—depends on the social 
conditions of innovative enterprise. The decision of the firm to confront uncertainty depends on 
the abilities and incentives of those who exercise strategic control. The larger socioeconomic 
environment provides the opportunity for innovation, but to set innovation in motion, the particular 
people who occupy positions of strategic control must possess abilities to lead the innovation 
process and incentives to take up a challenge despite a distinct possibility of failure.   
  
These strategic decision-makers must identify the organizational-learning processes in which to 
invest in order to generate a higher-quality product, and they must put into place incentive systems 
designed to integrate the work of large numbers of people with different hierarchical 
responsibilities and functional specialties to achieve the collective and cumulative learning that is 
the essence of innovation. The incentive system must include not only pay structures to motivate 
and reward productive effort but also promotion opportunities through which each employee can 
 
13
 For the sake of argument, in Figure 2, the innovating firm chooses to “make” rather than “buy” the input at a point at which the 
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build a career in the hope that it will span decades. As Penrose recognizes, organizational 
integration entails investment in people, who, in effect, represent part of the innovating firm’s fixed 
cost.  
  
Finally, those in positions of strategic control must mobilize financial resources to sustain the 
innovation process until it can generate the innovative products that yield financial returns. For 
new ventures, some form of private equity provides this committed finance, with a listing on a 
public stock market representing an “exit strategy” through which the private-equity investors can 
extract returns from their investments in the firm. For established companies that are generating 
profits, the fundamental source of financial commitment is the cash that a company retains out of 
profits and reinvests in productive capabilities.  
  
To sum up: In my elaboration of TIE, I use the distinction between fixed cost and variable cost to 
argue that an innovating firm that experiences rising variable cost as it seeks to expand output will 
recognize the need to exercise control over the quality of the variable input, the use of which is 
causing the rise in cost. To do so, the innovating firm will integrate the production of that input 
into its internal operations, thus transforming the variable cost of using the market into a fixed cost 
of investing in the enterprise. This strategic move will place the innovating firm at a competitive 
disadvantage at low levels of output (as shown in Figure 1), increasing the imperative that it attain 
a large market share to drive down unit cost. Moreover, there is often a high fixed cost of accessing 
the product market and securing a large share of it through branding, advertising, distribution 
channels, a salaried sales force, etc. Indeed, in some industries the fixed cost of accessing a large 
market share is greater than the fixed cost of investing in the transformation of production 
technologies.   
  
Whether done for the sake of transforming technologies, accessing markets, or both, investment in 
productive capabilities, including first and foremost those of its labor force, drives innovation and 
the growth of the firm. To retain and motivate those whom the firm has hired and trained, and who 
have accumulated productive experience through their work, the innovating firm generally offers 
these employees higher pay, more employment security, superior benefits, and more interesting 
work, all of which add to the fixed cost of the productive asset that an employee’s labor represents. 
The innovating firm makes its employees better off, but it can afford, and indeed profit from, the 
increased labor expense when that labor’s productive capability enables the firm to gain a 
competitive advantage by generating a higher-quality, lower-cost product.   
  
The innovating firm shares the gains of innovation with its employees by making investments in 
what I have called their “collective and cumulative careers.”15 Under such circumstances, increases 
in labor incomes and increases in labor productivity tend to show a highly positive correlation— 
an interconnection that, I argue, was prevalent in U.S. business enterprises in the decades after 
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World War II when, for white males at least, the “career with one company” was the employment 
norm.16  
  
When successful, the innovating firm may come to dominate its industry, with output that is larger 
and unit cost—and hence, potentially, its product price—that is lower than if a large number of 
small firms continued to populate the industry. The overall gains from innovation will depend on 
the relation between the innovating firm’s cost structure and the industry’s demand structure, while 
the distribution of those gains among the firm’s various “stakeholders” will depend on their relative 
power to extract the value that they helped to create.17 Indeed, as documented in my book with 
Jang-Sup Shin, Predatory Value Extraction,18 and as will be discussed in the conclusion of this 
essay, problems of unstable employment, inequitable incomes, and slowing productivity arise 
when those who have the power to extract the most value from the firm are those whose make the 
smallest—and in many cases negative— contributions to the value-creation process.  
  
There are gains to innovative enterprise that can be shared, and the ways in which these gains are 
shared determine the extent to which the innovative enterprise contributes to stable and equitable 
growth in the economy as a whole. In expanding output and lowering cost, it is theoretically 
possible (although by no means inevitable) for the gains to innovative enterprise to permit, 
simultaneously, higher pay, more stable employment, and better work conditions for employees; a 
stronger balance sheet for the firm; more secure paper for creditors; higher dividends and stock 
prices for shareholders; more tax revenues for governments; and higher-quality products at lower 
prices for consumers. Innovative enterprise provides a foundation for achieving sustainable 
prosperity.  
  
3.  The Neoclassical Fallacy  
  
The theory of perfect competition, which is the neoclassical economist’s ideal of economic 
efficiency, views the firm as impotent and the market as omnipotent in allocating the economy’s 
resources. By the neoclassical theory’s key assumptions, the firm in perfect competition is, as Paul 
Samuelson himself revealed (and then, as we shall see, concealed), an unproductive firm. Indeed, 
the more unproductive the firm, the smaller the firm’s output as a proportion of industry output, 
and, hence, the more “perfect” the competition! Yet, neoclassical theory posits the firm in perfect 
competition as the microfoundation of an economy in which the allocation of resources results in 
the ideal of economic efficiency, even if because of “market imperfections” that ideal is difficult 
or impossible to attain.  
  
If neoclassical logic concerning the relation between firm productivity and economic performance 
sounds absurd, that is because it is. Over seventy-five years ago, Joseph Schumpeter, with his focus 
on innovation as the fundamental phenomenon of economic development, argued that “perfect 
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competition is not only impossible but inferior, and has no title to being set up as a model of ideal 
efficiency.” The reason: Large-scale enterprise is “the most powerful engine of [economic] 
progress and in particular of the long-run expansion of total output.”19   
  
The neoclassical theory of the firm in perfect competition cannot explain why for well over a 
century very large firms have dominated the U.S. economy. 20  In the 1950s, when Penrose 
researched and wrote TGF,  the large industrial corporation was central to U.S. economic power, 
and within the United States this power was concentrated in a relatively small number of large 
corporations. In 1959, 44 of the world’s 50 largest corporations in terms of revenues were based 
in the United States, with the remaining six headquartered in Europe. In that year, U.S. corporations 
with assets of $100 million or more accounted for one-tenth of one percent of all corporations, but 
over 55 percent of all corporate assets, almost 55 percent of before-tax corporate profits, and 68 
percent of all corporate dividends.21    
  
In 2016, 1,046 companies that had 10,000 or more employees in the United States, with an average 
workforce of 35,157, were only 0.017 percent of all U.S. businesses. But these 1,046 companies 
had 10 percent of all establishments, 29 percent of employees, 33 percent of payrolls, and an 
estimated 37 percent of all revenues. For 2,102 companies with 5,000 or more employees in 2016, 
these shares were 12 percent of establishments, 35 percent of employees, 40 percent of payrolls, 
and an estimated 46 percent of revenues.22 How these large companies allocate the resources under 
their control has profound implications for employment opportunity, income distribution, and 
productivity growth in the United States.  
  
Given their adherence to the “perfect competition” ideal, neoclassical economists view these large 
firms as “market imperfections,” also known as monopolies or oligopolies. By focusing economic 
analysis on how the efficiency of the large-scale enterprise falls short of an absurd ideal, the 
neoclassical perspective precludes an analysis of the productive power of these large firms—and 
of how they may, or may not, contribute to the achievement of stable and equitable economic 
growth. In short, neoclassical economics lacks a theory of innovative enterprise. More generally, 
neoclassical economics avoids the analysis of how, through organizational learning, businesses 
develop productive capabilities as well as the conditions under which innovative investment 
activities can contribute to stable and equitable growth in the economy as a whole.  
  
If we go back to the basics of the neoclassical theory of the firm, we can perceive what Schumpeter 
meant when he wrote that “perfect competition…has no title to being set up as a model of ideal 
efficiency.” As conventionally defined, perfect competition exists when each among a very large 
number of identical firms in an industry has such a small share of total industry output that any 
individual firm, acting on its own, can produce its profit-maximizing output without influencing 
the price of the industry’s product. Each of these identical firms is constrained to be very small by 
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the assumption that at a very low level of the firm’s output relative to the size of the industry’s 
total output the firm’s increasing AVC overwhelms decreasing AFC, so that the firm faces a 
Ushaped cost curve in deciding how much output to produce. It follows mathematically that the 
firm maximizes profit at the output at which marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Thus, we have 
the theory of the optimizing firm that holds center stage—and indeed the only stage—in virtually 
every introductory economics textbook used worldwide.23  
   
With the publication of Economics: An Introductory Analysis in 1948, Paul Samuelson created the 
model for the modern “principles” textbook. It was reissued in 18 subsequent editions with 
Samuelson as the sole author through the 11th edition, published in 1980.24 The large corporation 
was by no means unknown to Samuelson. In the first edition, in a section entitled “The Giant 
Corporation,” he observes: “A list of the 200 largest nonfinancial corporations reads like an honor 
roll of American business, almost every name being a familiar household word.”25 After naming a 
number of the largest of these companies and referring as well to the 60 largest financial 
corporations, Samuelson states:  
  
The tremendous concentration of economic power involved in these giant corporations may 
be gauged from the following facts: they alone own more than half of the total assets of all 
nonfinancial corporations, more than a third of all banking assets, and four-fifths of life 
insurance assets. In manufacturing alone, the 100 most important companies employed more 
than one-fifth of all manufacturing labor and accounted for one-third of the total value of all 
manufactured products.26   
  
Samuelson recognizes that “their power did not grow overnight” and that “large size breeds 
success, and success breeds further success.”27 He devotes five pages to “the evil of monopoly” 
and “the pyramiding of holding companies” enabled by the separation of share ownership from 
managerial control.28 Samuelson then tells the reader that, “lest it be thought that the present 
chapter emphasizes too strongly the defects of the big business,” he is quoting a statement from 
Joseph Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy in which “the world-famous 
economist” notes the contributions of large corporations to rising standards of living. After 
assessing the evidence, Schumpeter concludes in the statement Samuelson quotes that “a shocking 
suspicion dawns upon us that big business may have had more to do with creating that standard 
of life than keeping it down.”29   
  
According to Samuelson, Schumpeter’s perspective “suggests that the future problem may not be 
one of choosing between large monopolistic corporations and small-scale competitors, but rather 
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that of devising ways to improve the social and economic performance of large corporate 
aggregates.”30 How, then, did these large corporations attain their dominant positions, and why 
did the top 100 manufacturers achieve high labor productivity relative to all manufacturers? The 
existence of very large, highly productive firms should have led economists to search for a theory 
of innovative enterprise as a foundation of economic analysis. 31  Yet not only Samuelson’s 
scientific papers, which being virtually all mathematical are devoid of empirical content, but also 
his famous “principles of economics” textbook in its successive editions promulgated the theory 
of the unproductive firm in perfect competition as the ideal of economic efficiency.    
  
Perfect competition idealizes the very small firm, its growth constrained by rising AVC as it 
expands output. But why does AVC rise? And why does it rise to such an extent that it outweighs 
declining AFC, resulting in the U-shaped cost curve? Current textbooks do not supply an 
explanation. For example, N. Gregory Mankiw, in his Principles of Microeconomics, simply states 
that the cost curve is U-shaped—representing “cost curves for a typical firm”32—and illustrates 
this “principle” with made-up numbers for a hypothetical coffee shop in which AVC increases 
from $0.30 for an output of one cup of coffee to $12.00 for an output of ten cups, with rising AVC 
surpassing declining AFC after six cups.33 Similarly, Paul Krugman and Robin Wells, in their 
Essentials of Economics, argue that a “realistic marginal cost curve has a ’swoosh’ shape”34 and 
give the example of a salsa maker whose AVC rises from $12.00 for an output of one case of salsa 
to $120.00 for an output of ten cases, with rising AVC surpassing declining AFC after an output 
of three cases.35 Be it Mankiw or Krugman/Wells or a slew of other prominent economists who 
compete in the introductory principles market, the textbook “explanation” for the U-shaped cost 
curve is simply a made-up numerical example! They make no attempt to explain to students what 
constrains the growth of the firm.  
  
Not so with Samuelson’s Economics, at least in the first through fifth editions, published between 
1948 and 1961.36 In these editions, Samuelson explains the U-shaped cost curve by assuming that 
labor is the firm’s main variable-cost input and that, with the addition of units of labor as the firm 
expands output, the average productivity of labor falls because of, in Samuelson’s words, 
“limitations of plant space and management difficulties.” As the professor puts it (with my 
emphasis) in the fifth edition of Economics, published in 1961 (with wording only slightly different 
from that in the first edition): “After the overhead has been spread thin over many units, it can no 
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longer have much influence on Average Cost. Variable items become important, and as Average 
Variable Cost begins to rise because of limitations of plant space and management difficulties, 
Average Cost finally begins to turn up.”37 There it is, the explanation of the most important 
“principle” of the neoclassical theory of the firm, and indeed of neoclassical microfoundations of 
macroeconomic performance, buried away on page 524 of an 853-page textbook. With this 
explanation of the limits on the growth of the firm, Samuelson argues that the most unproductive 
firm is the foundation of the most efficient economy. How so?  
  
Note, first, that in Samuelson’s explanation quoted above, he states (with my emphasis) that 
“Average Cost finally begins to turn up.” The word “finally” betrays Samuelson’s methodological 
bias because if the average cost curve does not turn up—that is, if rising AVC does not outweigh 
declining AFC as the firm’s output increases—then the decision rule of marginal revenue equals 
marginal cost in determining the firm’s optimal output will not come into operation. Yet the general 
applicability of this principle of constrained optimization is Samuelson’s key methodological 
contribution to economic analysis.38  
  
More important, however, is Samuelson’s cryptic, yet clear, explanation of why “Average Cost 
finally begins to turn up.” When I used the fifth edition of Samuelson’s Economics in my very first 
economics course in 1964, I was told that what Professor Samuelson was arguing was that, as the 
firm expands output and more workers are added to the workplace as variable inputs, their average 
productivity falls because of overcrowding that causes them to bump into one another—that is, 
Samuelson’s “limitations of plant space”—and because the increase in the number of workers to 
be supervised makes it more difficult for the employer to prevent workers from shirking—that is, 
Samuelson’s “management difficulties.” The resultant decline in labor productivity as output 
increases causes AVC to rise. In other words, Samuelson’s explanation for rising AVC is that 
workers can’t work and won’t work. And the faster the average productivity of labor declines as 
the firm expands output, the lower the level of output at which “Average Cost finally begins to 
turn up.”  
  
For the theory of the optimizing firm to be applicable, it is not sufficient for AVC to increase as 
output expands. The cost curve gets its U shape when the rise in AVC is so large that it overwhelms 
the fall in AFC. The rising ATC, reflecting declining productivity as the firm expands its output, 
constrains the growth of the firm. It follows that the lower the level of output at which, because of 
limitations of plant space and management difficulties, the rise in AVC outweighs the decline in 
AFC, the smaller the firm relative to the size of its industry, and hence the more the fundamental 
condition for “perfect competition” prevails.    
  
And since, according to neoclassical economists, perfect competition is the ideal of economic 
efficiency, it follows from Samuelson’s own explanation of the limits to the growth of the firm that 
the most unproductive firm—one in which, at the lowest level of output, the inability and 
unwillingness of workers to work cause “Average Cost [to] finally…turn up”—provides the 
microeconomic foundation for the most efficient possible economy!  
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Let me repeat this crucial point: The theory of perfect competition idealizes a situation in which 
the rise of AVC outweighs the decline of AFC at very low levels of firm output relative to industry 
output. As a result, there are very large numbers of identical competitors in the industry, each of 
which, by virtue of its small size, can sell its profit-maximizing output without having a discernible 
impact on the industry’s product price (part of the definition of perfect competition). By 
Samuelson’s own explanation of why “Average Cost finally begins to turn up,” the firms in perfect 
competition are very small relative to the size of the industry because they are very unproductive, 
employing labor whose average productivity falls as the firm’s output expands. Thus, the 
unproductive firm is the foundation of the neoclassical ideal of economic efficiency known as 
“perfect competition.”  
  
“Just a minute,” the well-trained neoclassical economist would complain. “What about the 
neoclassical theory of monopoly that one can also find in every introductory economics textbook, 
with its demonstration that, in contrast to the ideal firm in perfect competition, the monopolist, 
maximizing profit subject to a downward-sloping demand curve, restricts output and raises the 
product’s price? Isn’t that proof of perfect competition as the ideal of economic efficiency?”   
  
No, it is not, as Schumpeter recognized some years before Samuelson published the first edition of 
Economics. There is a logical flaw in the neoclassical monopoly model that yields the “results”—
restricted output, higher price—that the neoclassical theory of perfect competition as the ideal of 
economic efficiency requires. As shown in Figure 3, this model assumes that the monopolist 
maximizes profit while subject to the same cost structure as the perfect competitors. But then how 
did the monopolist become a monopolist?   
  
In the neoclassical theory of the firm, rather than confront “limitations of plant space” and 
“management difficulties,” the employer just optimizes subject to these “given” constraints. In 
sharp contrast, the employer in the theory of innovative enterprise could confront “limitations of 
plant space” by investing in more spacious plant and “management difficulties” by creating 
incentives such as employment security to induce workers to supply higher levels of effort. These 
investments and incentives would add to the firm’s fixed cost, but if the innovating firm can 
increase its productivity sufficiently by making and implementing these expenditures, it may be 
able to outcompete the optimizing firm, as shown in Figures 1 and 2 above and in the right-hand 
size of Figure 3.   
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Figure 3: The logical flaw in the neoclassical monopoly model   
  
  
According to TIE, the firm grows large, and outcompetes perfect competitors, by transforming the 
cost structure—by, for example, investing in more spacious plant to prevent overcrowding, 
creating positive incentives for employees to expend more work effort, or, in a knowledgeintensive 
industry, launching an R&D initiative that may yield a higher-quality product. Compared with 
perfect competitors, who follow the neoclassical directive to optimize subject to given constraints, 
the innovating firm increases output and, by driving down AFC as it expands output, can lower the 
product price to consumers while still increasing its profits. For the prosperity of the economy, 
that’s a big plus. For neoclassical theory, however, that’s a big minus.  
                          
Samuelson’s theory requires the firm that is the “ideal of economic efficiency” to be and to remain 
small and unproductive. If the economy is dominated by firms in which, to use Samuelson’s own 
words, “large size breeds success, and success breeds further success,” then perfect competition as 
the “ideal of economic efficiency” disappears and “constrained optimization” may not be the 
management practice that achieves superior economic performance.   
  
As Samuelson writes in the Introduction to his textbook, “the test of a theory’s validity is its 
usefulness in illuminating observed reality.”39 On that test, the theory of the unproductive firm as 
the ideal of economic efficiency receives a failing grade. As Samuelson himself puts it in the 
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concluding sentence of the Introduction: “When a student says, ‘That’s all right in theory but not 
in practice,’ he really means, ‘That’s not all right in the relevant theory,’ or else he is talking 
nonsense.”40  
  
Thank you, Professor Samuelson. In propounding the theory of the unproductive firm as the 
foundation of the most efficient economy, you were talking nonsense, and your students, broadly 
construed, have been repeating this drivel ever since. As we have already seen, Samuelson was 
well aware that the real-world economy can be dominated by large firms that are highly productive. 
In Chapter 2 (“Central Problems of Every Economic Society”) of the fifth edition of Economics, 
Samuelson discusses “Increasing Costs” and “The Famous Law of Diminishing Returns” (both 
subheadings) and provides a table with a numerical example that bears the heading “Diminishing 
returns is a fundamental law of economics and technology” and the caption “Returns of corn when 
units of labor are added to fixed land.”41 On the very next page, however, he has the subheading, 
“Economies of Scale and Mass Production: A Digression,”42 with the explanation: “Economies of 
scale are very important in explaining why so many of the goods we buy are produced by large 
companies...They raise questions to which we shall return again and again in later chapters.”41   
  
Samuelson makes his “honor roll of American business” remark, cited above, 100 pages later. But 
it would be an exaggeration to say that the professor kept his promise to “return [to this central 
problem of every economic society] again and again.” After all, for Samuelson the actual 
importance of economies of scale to the productive economy was just “a digression” from his 
obsession with “the famous law of diminishing returns” as a “fundamental law of economics and 
technology.”43   
  
Was Paul Samuelson aware of this fundamental flaw in his economic thinking? There is 
“smokinggun” evidence that in the course of revising Economics in the early 1960s, Professor 
Samuelson gave this glaring contradiction between neoclassical ideology and economic reality 
some deeper thought and came to realize the fallacy of arguing that the unproductive firm is the 
ideal of economic efficiency. Once the light bulb went off in his brain, he could have then resolved 
the problem by renouncing the neoclassical theory of the firm and calling for the construction of a 
theory of innovative enterprise—drawing upon, for example, Edith Penrose’s seminal contribution, 
The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, published in 1959, and Alfred Chandler’s pioneering 
historical research documented in his 1962 book Strategy and Structure.44   
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But Samuelson simply ignored the work of Penrose and Chandler as he rolled out successive 
editions of Economics. Like economies of scale and mass production, these eminent scholars were 
apparently mere digressions. Instead, as part of a significant revision of the material on cost curves 
in the sixth edition of Economics, Samuelson concealed the neoclassical fallacy as articulated in 
the five previous editions by excising the sentences quoted above about overhead being spread 
thin and average cost increasing because of limitations of plant space and management difficulties.    
  
Beginning with the sixth edition, published in 1964, Samuelson would invoke the “famous law of 
diminishing returns” to justify the nonsense that the unproductive firm in perfect competition is 
the ideal of economic efficiency—with absolutely no explanation of why increasing cost sets in 
and a rise in variable cost causes the average total cost curve to turn up  And, over the subsequent 
generations, economists such as N. Gregory Mankiw and Paul Krugman, among other luminaries 
of the economics profession, have published textbooks that reproduce this nonsense as a principle 
of economics, taught routinely to students and requiring neither examination nor explanation.  
  
The problem with perfect competition as the ideal of economic efficiency is not just that millions 
upon millions of economics students have been, and continue to be, miseducated about the role of 
the business enterprise in the economy. The much larger problem is that the “well-trained” PhD 
economists who are supposed to be the educators—including those to whom the Sveriges Riksbank 
Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, popularly known as the Nobel Prize in 
Economics,45 has been meted out—internalize the inanity that the unproductive firm is the ideal of 
economic efficiency, and in so doing portray the “ideal” firm as a powerless entity that does not, 
and should not, interfere with the market’s coordination of the allocation of the economy’s 
resources.   
  
In my own teaching, I have called this view of the world “sweatshop economics” because the 
overcrowded and unmotivated firm that Samuelson describes as the microfoundation of ideal 
efficiency does, in fact, have the characteristics of a sweatshop. If such firms actually dominated 
the economy, we would, in a nation such as the United States, all be living in poverty.46  And, in 
fact, in many parts of the world where sweatshops prevail, the “neoclassical” firm and mass poverty 
go hand in hand.47  
  
Meanwhile, the “well-trained” economist views the highly productive firms that grow large, and 
perhaps even dominate the industries in which they operate, as massive “market imperfections” 
that impede the purported efficiency of market resource allocation. In the real economic world, 
however, the innovative enterprise is a powerful entity that, by transforming technologies and 
accessing markets, succeeds in generating the higher-quality, lower-cost goods and services that 
constitute productivity growth. Far from being a market imperfection, the innovative enterprise, 
properly supported and regulated, can by confronting and transforming the “neoclassical 
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constraints” on the growth of the firm provide the productive foundations for achieving stable and 
equitable economic growth. If we want economic policies that advance these objectives, then we 
need a theory of innovative enterprise as a foundation of economic analysis.  
  
The sad irony, however, is that the myth of the market economy that builds on the neoclassical 
fallacy actually undermines the social conditions of innovative enterprise that, if put in place with 
proper government support and regulation, could enable big business to contribute to stable and 
equitable economic growth. The next section of this essay explains what I mean by “the myth of 
the market economy.” The final section outlines how the neoclassical fallacy provides a theoretical 
foundation for the destructive ideology that a company should be run to “maximize shareholder 
value,” while it precludes “well-trained” economists from contemplating, let alone analyzing, the 
social conditions of innovative enterprise.  
  
4. The Myth of the Market Economy  
  
If PhD economists were to go back to the fifth edition of Samuelson’s Economics, from which the 
“unproductive firm” explanation for the U-shaped cost curve had not yet been excised, their 
teaching on “perfect competition” would require them to embrace a theory of the firm that rests on 
nine assumptions that build on one another, with each assumption more preposterous than the 
previous one. The nine assumptions of what I have called the neoclassical fallacy are:  
  
i. Assume (as Samuelson states on page 524 of the fifth edition of Economics) that the growth of 
the firm is constrained because of overcrowding of the workplace and loss of control over labor 
effort as the firm seeks to expand output and more units of labor are added as a variable cost.  
ii. Assume that the increase in AVC outweighs the decrease in AFC, causing a rise in ATC that 
in turn yields a U-shaped cost curve and, hence, a rising marginal cost (i.e., supply) curve.  
iii. Assume that the “entrepreneur” simply optimizes subject to these productivity and cost 
constraints, opting not to make investments in the firm to deal with overcrowding and control 
loss.  
iv. Assume that ALL FIRMS in the industry are equally constrained by an unwillingness to take 
risk (e.g., by investing in a more spacious plant) or manage labor (e.g., by offering positive 
incentives to employees), so that no firm in the industry is able or willing to make any 
investments to overcome internal diseconomies of scale.  
                                                         
sweatshops was wrong,” New York Times, April 27, 2017, at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/27/opinion/do-sweatshops-
liftworkers-out-of-poverty.html?emc=eta1.   
v. Assume that the level of output at which rising AVC outweighs declining AFC is SO SMALL 
relative to industry output that each firm can sell its profit-maximizing output without having 
a discernible impact on the industry’s product price (i.e., the industry is in a state of “perfect 
competition”). vi. Assume as proof that “perfect competition” is the ideal of efficiency that a 
firm that has emerged as dominant in an industry (i.e., a “monopolist”) maximizes profit at an 
output that is lower and a price that is higher than the industry output and price under “perfect 
competition”—and that it does so because it maximizes profit subject to the same cost structure 
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that would characterize the “perfect competitors” that the monopolist has purportedly 
displaced.  
vii. Assume, therefore, that the large-scale industrial enterprise is a massive “market imperfection.”   
viii. Assume from this illogical monopoly model that a state of “imperfect” competition represents 
a deviation from “perfect” competition that reduces economic efficiency.  
  
And once, on the basis of these eight assumptions, you as a PhD in economics conclude that the 
most unproductive firm is the foundation of the most efficient economy, the all-important ninth 
assumption naturally follows: ix. Assume you are a well-trained economist.  
  
You will then, wittingly or not, become an intellectual purveyor of the myth of the market 
economy. You will assume that, to achieve economic efficiency, market forces must determine 
economic outcomes, with highly unproductive firms contributing to efficiency by responding to 
the dictates of supply and demand as they equate marginal revenue and marginal cost to maximize 
profit. You will then believe that competition in the markets for products, labor, and finance result 
in the most efficient product prices, wage rates, and interest rates. And, intellectually captive to the 
myth of the market economy, you will remain impervious to the reality of how an actual economy 
functions and performs.  
  
Comparative-historical study reveals that markets in products, labor, and finance, as well as in 
land, are outcomes, not causes, of economic development.48 Product competition assumes the 
existence of business enterprises that have developed the productive capabilities to generate goods 
and services of a quality that buyers want or need and that can be sold at prices they are willing or 
able to pay. Markets in stocks and bonds depend on the existence of business enterprises with the 
productive capabilities to issue and pay yields on these securities. Employment opportunities that 
can be accessed via labor markets assume the existence of business enterprises and government 
agencies that have developed the productive capabilities to employ labor productively. A market 
for land exists because households, governments, and businesses have invested in the infrastructure 
of a particular locality.    
  
For the sake of continued innovation, the organizations on which the economy depends for 
investments in productive capabilities need governments to regulate markets once they have 
emerged.49 In the absence of regulation, markets tend to disrupt and undermine the organizational 
processes that enable investment in productive capabilities. Here are four well-known examples:   
• Inadequate minimum wages that result from overcrowded markets for commoditized labor 
have left many hardworking families in poverty in the United States, even when the heads of 
households are holding down two full-time jobs.   
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• The “free-market” approach to college tuitions and student loans that prevails in the United 
States has made higher education unaffordable to most working-class households, in a nation 
that had once been in the forefront of free or low-cost public higher education.   
• We need only look back to the financial crisis of 2008-2009 to see the vast devastation visited 
on American homeowners by government failure to regulate housing markets.  
• The physical destruction of communities occurs through “natural” disasters caused by the 
failure to regulate industries whose processes and products contribute to climate change.   
These outcomes are not “market failures”; they are regulatory failures. And the policy responses 
of “well-trained” neoclassical economists who are concerned by these adverse economic and 
environmental outcomes fail because these economists are intellectually captive to the myth of the 
market economy.  
  
The TIE approach to understanding the operation and performance of the economy stands in stark 
contrast to the neoclassical focus on market coordination of economic activity. The neoclassical 
theory of the market economy poses an almost impenetrable intellectual barrier to analyzing and 
understanding the organizational foundations of economic development. Steeped in the 
neoclassical fallacy, neoclassical economists assume that an advanced economy is a market 
economy in which millions of household decisions concerning the allocation of the economy’s 
resources are aggregated into prices for inputs to and outputs from production processes. Any 
impediments to this process of market aggregation are deemed to be “market imperfections,” and, 
among neoclassical economists with a liberal social outlook, any undesirable social outcomes from 
the process are deemed to be “market failures.”   
  
Markets are of utmost importance to our economy and society; they can allow us as individuals to 
choose the work we do, by whom we are employed, where we live, and what we consume. Insofar 
as we have market choices, however, it is because the economy is wealthy, and it is wealthy 
because of investments in productive capabilities by business enterprises, supported by 
investments in infrastructure by government agencies and investments in the labor force by many 
tens of millions of household units.   
  
I call these three types of organizations—business enterprises, government agencies, and 
household units—working in concert to develop a nation’s productive capabilities “the investment 
triad.”50 If market processes cannot explain investment in productive capabilities, then the theory 
of the market economy cannot explain the wealth of nations. Economists who want to devise public 
policies to shape the processes and influence the outcomes of investment in productive capabilities 
need to construct an economic theory of “organizational success.” At its center is a theory of 
innovative enterprise.  
  
5. Innovative Enterprise and Sustainable Prosperity  
  
Most economists would agree that the purpose of economic policy should be to help the economy 
achieve stable and equitable growth. Building on the Penrosian insight that the growth of the firm 
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depends on investments in organizational learning, TIE focuses on the social conditions that 
determine who controls the firm’s investment strategy, how the firm integrates the skills and efforts 
of large numbers of employees into organizational-learning processes, and what sources of finance 
the firm mobilizes to sustain the innovation process until it can generate competitive products. The 
growth of the firm through innovation—the generation of higher-quality, lower-cost products than 
previously existed—provides the microeconomic foundation for macroeconomic growth.   
  
That growth can become a foundation for sustainable prosperity when the corporation shares with 
employees the gains from innovation, which in a given accounting period manifest themselves as 
profits, in the form of secure employment, higher wages, superior benefits, promotion 
opportunities, and satisfying work. Indeed, the history of modern capitalism shows that when a 
nation’s major business corporations share the gains of innovation with employees, a substantial 
portion of the population experiences upward socioeconomic mobility that results in a strong and 
growing middle class.51 The prosperity is sustainable because the innovative enterprise rewards 
employees whose skills and efforts have contributed to the productivity from which higher wages 
and benefits can be paid. If managed properly, moreover, the ongoing integration of these 
employees into collective and cumulative learning processes can renew the innovative capabilities, 
embodied in its labor force, with which the enterprise can compete on product markets.  
  
Hence the importance to U.S. economic development both of Penrose’s focus on the firm’s 
redeployment of unused productive capabilities into new lines of business in which it can generate 
innovative products, and of Chandler’s focus on managerial organization in the multidivisional 
structure to enable the growth of the firm.  By the 1950s, when both Penrose and Chandler did 
their seminal research, employment relations within major U.S. business corporations had become 
characterized by the expectation of a career with one company for members of both the blue-collar 
and white-collar labor forces. Adopting a “retain-and-reinvest” resource-allocation regime, major 
U.S. corporations retained a substantial portion of profits and reinvested in the productive 
capabilities of their employees, sharing with them, in the form of secure employment and rising 
remuneration, the gains of innovative enterprise that these employees helped to create. As a result, 
in the U.S. economy as a whole, the growth of real wages tracked the growth of productivity, and 
there was a tendency toward less income inequality.52  
  
Since the late 1970s, however, there has been a growing gap between productivity growth and 
wage growth, resulting in downward socioeconomic mobility for Americans with only high-school 
educations. Over these decades U.S. business corporations have transitioned from the “retain-
andreinvest” resource-allocation regime, characterized by career-with-one-company employment, 
to a “downsize-and-distribute” resource-allocation regime. Under the latter, major U.S. 
corporations downsize their labor forces—at times terminating long-time employees even when 
the firm is profitable, often in the context of outsourcing and offshoring—and distribute corporate 
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cash to shareholders in the form of dividends and buybacks.53 Based on the business practices 
Penrose observed in the 1950s, she assumed that, through diversification, the business corporation 
would seek to make use of its “unused resources,” by which she meant first and foremost the labor 
services of its experienced employees. By the 1990s, however, as the downsize-and-distribute 
regime became widespread, the assumption that a corporation would seek to make use of its unused 
labor services could no longer be made.54   
  
The rise in the late 1980s of the corporate-governance ideology that a company should be run to 
“maximize shareholder value” (MSV) legitimized the replacement of retain-and-reinvest by 
downsize-and-distribute as the dominant regime of corporate resource allocation in the United 
States.55 The leading academic advocate for MSV was Michael C. Jensen, a Chicago-School  
“agency theorist,” who from 1985 disseminated this ideology as a professor at Harvard Business 
School. Jensen argued that for the sake of superior economic performance corporations should 
“disgorge” their “free cash flow” so that financial markets would be able to allocate these financial 
resources to their most efficient uses.56 The term “disgorge” implies that the funds that a company 
retains out of profits are ill-gotten when controlled by the corporation rather than distributed to its 
shareholders, while the term “free” could be applied to cash flow made available by laying off 
employees, including longstanding personnel who had contributed to the growth of the firm and 
had held the realistic expectation of a career with one company.   
  
Economists who have absorbed the neoclassical fallacy, to which both Chicago-School 
conservatives (acolytes of Milton Friedman)  and Harvard-MIT liberals (acolytes of Samuelson) 
adhere, do not have a theoretical explanation for why labor,  which they view as a variable cost, 
would actually represent a part of a firm’s fixed cost—that is, a productive asset in which the firm 
invests.57 For TIE, superior labor productivity derives partly from the development of employees’ 
capabilities through their work experience and partly from the utilization of those capabilities to 
capture product markets in order to reap economies of scale and scope.58  
  
Nor can neoclassical economists comprehend the growth dynamic linking productivity and pay 
that, occurring within the innovating firm, can raise the living standards of the company’s labor 
force. Rather, they see wage determination by the forces of supply and demand on labor markets 
as resulting in the most efficient allocation of the economy’s resources. More generally, espousing 
the fallacy that the most unproductive firm is the foundation of the most efficient economy, they 
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lack a theory of how, through the productivity-pay dynamic, the actual efficiency of the economy 
can change over time as wages increase on a sustainable basis.   
  
Similarly, once one has accepted the validity of the neoclassical fallacy, one assumes, as all 
neoclassical economists do, that financial markets allocate resources to their “most efficient 
uses”—yet they lack a theory of how the most efficient uses come to exist. Nor can the believer in 
the neoclassical fallacy comprehend theoretically how economic performance can be enhanced 
when corporate executives retain strategic control over the allocation of some or all of the firm’s 
profits to invest in the firm’s productive capabilities rather than “disgorge the free cash flow,” 
ostensibly to be reallocated to its “most efficient uses” via financial markets.  
  
The consequences of the colossal intellectual failure of neoclassical economics are not merely 
academic. Guided by the theory of innovative enterprise, research by my colleagues and me 
explains how, since the mid-1980s, MSV ideology has functioned to legitimize the implementation 
of the Chicago-School agenda by means of massive open-market issuer repurchases—aka stock 
buybacks. The purpose of stock buybacks done as open-market repurchases is to manipulate a 
company’s stock price, concentrating income in the bank accounts of the richest households and 
making most Americans worse off.59   
  
As I have detailed elsewhere,60 TIE explains the risk-taking roles of households as taxpayers and 
households as workers in contributing to the value-creation processes that can generate corporate 
profits. These “stakeholders” have a claim to a share of those profits if and when they occur. In 
contrast, sharesellers, including senior executives, investment bankers, and hedge-fund managers, 
reap financial gains by timing their stock trades around buybacks at the expense not only of 
taxpayers and workers but also of those shareholders who, as the word says, hold their shares for 
the sake of dividend yields. Intellectually captive to the neoclassical fallacy, even “progressive” 
neoclassical economists who are deeply concerned with income inequality have failed to mount a 
critique of the MSV agenda to “disgorge the free cash flow” as a prime source of the extreme 
income inequality that prevails in the United States.  
  
The transformation of the U.S. business corporation from retain-and-reinvest to downsize-
anddistribute that the MSV agenda legitimizes occurred in the decades after Penrose published 
TGF. 61  Yet the massive value extraction represented by the distribution of the corporation’s 
financial resources, via dividends to shareholders and via buybacks to sharesellers, assumes a prior 
era of innovative value creation in the history of the particular firm. Understanding the 
phenomenon that, in our recent book, Jang-Sup Shin and I call “predatory value extraction” 
requires a theory of innovative enterprise. As I have argued in this essay, Penrosian learning 
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provides an essential building block for a theory of innovative enterprise, which in turn exposes 
the neoclassical fallacy.   
  
In TGF, however, Penrose herself averts a confrontation with the neoclassical theory of the firm 
by arguing that its proponents are welcome to go on tending their intellectual garden while she will 
use her own methods to tend hers. As she puts it in TGF:  
  
Educated laymen as well as economists studying the vagaries of actual business behavior 
often show an understandable impatience with the ‘theory of the firm’, for they see in it 
little that reflects the facts of life as they understand them. It is therefore worth a little 
trouble, perhaps, to discuss at the very beginning the nature of the ‘firm’ in the ‘theory of 
the firm’, to indicate why it provides an unsuitable framework for a theory of the growth 
of firms, but at the same time to make clear that we shall not be involved in any quarrel 
with the theory of the ‘firm’ as part of the theory of price and production, so long as it 
cultivates its own garden and we cultivate ours. Much confusion can arise from the careless 
assumption that when the term ‘firm’ is used in different contexts it always means the same 
thing.62  
  
Penrose is in effect portraying what I have called the “optimizing firm” and the “innovating firm” 
as two distinct theories of the firm that can be used for different analytical purposes. On this point, 
Penrose fails to see the profundity of the theory of the firm that she constructed by focusing on its 
growth—or one might say its “historical transformation”—over time. As I first pointed out in my 
contributions in the early 1980s to the debate on Britain’s economic decline,63  what economists 
call constrained-optimization analysis can be useful for examining how the firm’s decision-makers 
adapt to the technological and market conditions that constrain their price and output choices at a 
given point in time.64 But as I demonstrated by analyzing the twentieth-century performance of 
British industry in global competition, the optimizing firm will fail to remain competitive in its 
industry when confronted by one or more innovating firms that, refusing to the take existing 
technological and market conditions as “given constraints,” instead use strategic control, 
organizational integration, and financial commitment to transform these conditions so as to 
generate higher-quality, lower-cost products than had previously existed.   
  
The “historical transformation,” methodology, which is consistent with Penrose’s approach to the 
theory of the firm, focuses on how, in particular historical contexts, the innovating firm transforms 
technologies and accesses markets—remaking industrial conditions that the optimizing firm takes 
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as “given constraints”—to generate a higher-quality, lower-cost product.65 When successful, as we 
have seen, the innovating firm outcompetes the optimizing firm by virtue of its superior 
productivity. In view of this analysis of the relation between the two “theories of the firm,” Penrose 
might have added: Neoclassical economists may prefer to tend their own theoretical garden, but 
they should recognize that without the nutrients supplied by investment in productive capabilities, 
the firms that populate their theoretical terrain will wilt and fade away.  
  
In the presence of “Schumpeterian competition,” innovative enterprise vanquishes the optimizing 
firms that neoclassical economists idealize. In seeking to compete through constrained 
optimization (as the neoclassical economist would advise), the optimizing firm fails to invest in 
the productive capabilities that would enable it to respond to the new competition by itself 
transforming the technological and market conditions that it faces. Economists who ignore the 
theory of the growth of the firm and the historical transformation of technological and markets 
conditions that are at its core are left with the argument that firms that engage in constrained 
optimization are doing the best that can be done in achieving economic efficiency.   
  
The neoclassical fallacy is, then, an extreme version of the neoclassical economist’s 
methodological commitment to the constrained-optimization technique for analyzing the firm’s 
output and price: the more constrained the firm as a productive entity, the more efficient the 
industry and economy of which these powerless firms are a part. Hence, as stated previously in 
this essay, adherence to the neoclassical fallacy enables the neoclassical economist to view the 
firm as impotent and the market as omnipotent in allocating the economy’s resources.  
  
Intellectually captive to constrained-optimization methodology, neoclassical economists fail to 
recognize the competitive limitations of constrained-optimization decision-making in industries 
dominated by innovative enterprise. As a prime example of this obeisance to 
constrainedoptimization methodology, in a survey of work in business history, business policy, 
and organizational behavior published in the Journal of Economic Literature in 1980, Richard 
Caves, a prominent neoclassical industrial-organization economist, concludes that “the well-
trained professional economist could have carried out many of the research projects cited in this 
paper more proficiently than did their authors, who were less effectively equipped by their own 
disciplines.”66  He continues:  
  
If one accepts the weak postulate that the firm is a purposive organization maximizing some 
objective function, it follows that its strategic and structural choice represents a 
constrainedoptimization problem. My reading is that students of business organization with 
disciplinary bases outside of economics would accept that proposition but have lacked the 
tools to follow its blueprint. Constrained-maximization problems are mother's milk to the 
well-trained economist.  
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Caves highlights Chandler’s Strategy and Structure and The Visible Hand as among the works by 
scholars “who were less effectively equipped by their own disciplines” to carry out research into, 
in this case, business history. Caves references Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, in 
a footnote as “an important antecedent” to arguments made by others concerning “the expansion 
of the firm holding fixed assets that cannot be costlessly divested in the short run,”67 thus grossly 
mischaracterizing Penrose as a “constrained-optimization” economist. Remember, as I stated at 
the outset of this essay, the definition of a “classic”: a work that many cite but few have read.  
  
Worse is the case of an economist who commented extensively on drafts of TGF but then chose 
not to cite Penrose’s book because it did not fit with his constrained-optimization view of the 
world. I am referring to Fritz Machlup, who was Penrose’s faculty advisor at Johns Hopkins 
University when she was studying for her doctorate from 1947 to 1951 and, subsequently, one of 
two Johns Hopkins faculty members who supervised Penrose as the researcher on their project on 
the growth of firms that in 1959 resulted in the publication of TGF. Penrose and Machlup remained 
friends until his death in 1983.68 Yet Machlup’s 1966 American Economic Association presidential 
address, entitled “Theories of the Firm: Marginalist, Behavioral, and Managerial,” takes up 
thirtyone pages of text and contains a total of forty-eight bibliographic references, but no mention 
of Penrose is to be found.69    
  
Why? It seems that given the centrality of organizational learning to Penrose’s argument, Machlup 
did not consider The Theory of the Growth of the Firm to be “economic theory” but rather 
“organization theory.” As a prelude to the concluding summary of his survey of the three types of 
theories of the firm, he states:  
  
I am not happy about the practice of calling any study just because it deals with or employs 
a concept of the firm "economics" or "microeconomics." But we cannot issue licenses for 
the use of such terms and, hence, must put up with their rather free use. My own prejudices 
balk at designating organization theory as economics – but other people's prejudices are 
probably different from mine, and we gain little or nothing from arguing about the correct 
scope of our field.70  
  
Earlier in his address, Machlup warns: “Frankly, I cannot quite see what great difference 
organizational matters are supposed to make in the firm’s price reaction to changes in conditions.”71 
Machlup was the quintessential neoclassical economist, obsessed with “marginalist” constrained-
optimization methodology as the definitive tool of economic analysis.  Machlup contends that 
managerial theories of the firm in which the firm’s decision-maker seeks to maximize an objective 
other than money profits can be subsumed within the constrainedoptimization framework through 
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“expanded marginalist objective functions”71 without impeding one’s understanding of how the 
economy functions and performs.  As he puts it:  
  
My charge that there is widespread confusion regarding the purposes of the “theory of the 
firm” as used in traditional price theory refers to this: The model of the firm in that  theory 
is not, as so many writers believe, designed to serve to explain and predict the behavior of 
real firms; instead, it is designed to explain and predict changes in observed prices (quoted, 
paid, received) as effects of particular changes in conditions (wage rates, interest rates, 
import duties, excise taxes, technology, etc.). In this causal connection the firm is only a 
theoretical link, a mental construct helping to explain how one gets from the cause to the 
effect. This is altogether different from explaining the behavior of a firm.72  
  
As Machlup summed up the “theories of the firm” surveyed in his presidential address:    
  
As far as the proponents of managerial theories are concerned, they have never claimed to 
be anything but marginalists, and the behavior goals they have selected as worthy for 
incorporation into behavior equations, along with the goal of making profits, were given a 
differentiable form so that they could become part of marginal analysis. Thus, instead of a 
heated contest between marginalism and managerialism in the theory of the firm, a 
marriage between the two has come about.73  
  
Machlup does not mention Penrose in his AEA presidential address because it is impossible to 
interpret her managerial theory of the firm as marginalism. Somehow, she had failed to imbibe the 
“mother’s milk” of the “well-trained economist,” as Caves would express it some years later. As 
Penrose put in it in a letter to Machlup in response to his comments on a draft of TGF: “Unlike 
you, I don’t have the answers to all the problems pat from a few simple premises. I don’t think the 
premises are as easy as you do.“ Or as she informed her mentor: “I don’t know all the answers 
before I start as you do.”74 Notwithstanding his unique position for observing the unfolding of 
Penrose’s work, Machlup’s intellectual attachment to constrained-optimization methodology 
rendered invisible to him her seminal contribution to economic theory, including her treatment of 
the relation between facts and logic—that is, history and theory.  
  
From my intellectual perspective, Penrose’s “historical transformation” methodology integrates 
history and theory. At a certain stage of our intellectual development, theory serves both as a 
distillation of what we have learned from the study of history and a guide to researching what we 
need to know as “the present as history” unfolds.75 As Penrose articulates it in an essay written in 
the late 1980s that, putting the shoe on the other foot, chastises historians for ignoring theory:  
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‘Theory’ is, by definition, a simplification of ‘reality’ but simplification is necessary in order 
to comprehend it at all, to make sense of ‘history’. If each event, each institution, each fact, 
were really unique in all aspects, how could we understand, or claim to understand, anything 
at all about the past, or indeed the present for that matter? If, on the other hand, there are 
common characteristics, and if such characteristics are significant in the course of events, then 
it is necessary to analyse both the characteristics and their significance and ‘theoretically’ to 
isolate them for that purpose.  
  
Then, applying the boot to “well-trained” economists, Penrose concludes: “universal truths without 
reference to time and space are unlikely to characterise economic affairs.”76  She might have added, 
a failure to integrate history and theory has led three generations of economists to accept the 
neoclassical fallacy as a universal truth. The next generation needs new economic thinking. Read 
Penrose’s “classic” for a start.  
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